6.2) (3) a notion of existence-entailment for properties (Subsect. 6.1) (2) a qualified Comprehension Principle for objects (Subsect. This is based upon (1) a modal semantics including impossible worlds (Subsect. 3–5, we discuss the approaches of (traditional) Meinongianism, Fictionalism, and Realism-and their main troubles. 2, we introduce the standard distinction between internal and external fictional discourse. 1, we make this explicit via two methodological principles, called the Minimal Revision and the Acceptability Constraint. An ideal theory should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse.
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